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ABSTRACT
Most large-scale studies on voluntary childlessness since the waning of the baby
boom provide cross-sectional estimates for a single time period. They cannot be
synthesized to estimate change because of the varied definitions used to operationalize
voluntary childlessness. In this study, I use data from the 1973-2002 cycles of the
National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) to estimate change in voluntary childlessness
using a consistent definition by period and birth cohort. I find that voluntary
childlessness stayed relatively constant through the seventies and eighties, but showed a
large increase from the mid-nineties to 2002. I show that voluntary childlessness
increased in recent years because baby-boomers postponed childbearing until they no
longer desired it, and younger women born in the seventies are now deciding to remain
childless earlier. I discuss the role of these younger women in establishing a ceiling for
voluntary childlessness. I also provide initial results supporting the theory that
voluntary childlessness is diffusing among women of lower education and higher
religiosity.

vi

INTRODUCTION
As fertility fell steeply after the baby boom, and the second wave of feminism and
the economic recession of the 1970s helped change women’s roles, social scientists
began to publish research on the growing phenomenon of voluntary childlessness.
Qualitative work with small samples found that some women chose to opt out of
motherhood entirely. They tended to be white, nonreligious, and highly educated; many
said that they had no desire for children, or felt that the opportunity costs of having
children would be too great (e.g., Veevers 1973). Some defined themselves as “childfree”
in favor of “childless,” because they felt liberated of children rather than lacking
children. Although the pronatalism of the post-World War II period had waned
somewhat, such attitudes toward childrearing were still controversial, and the
voluntarily childless found stigma management to be a fairly regular chore (May 1995;
Veevers 1975).
The quantitative research offers a much less consistent picture. Studies from
various sources of nationally representative data have shown voluntary childlessness to
occur at significantly different rates. Sources for the 1980s alone vary between 1.8
percent and 6.4 percent in their estimates of voluntary childlessness in the United
States. Since it can be difficult to operationally define voluntary childlessness, strategies
for doing so tend to differ widely between sources and researchers, hence the variation
in these percentages.
The academic literature on voluntary childlessness has been growing, albeit
relatively slowly, for the past thirty years. The demographic profile of voluntary
childlessness has seemingly not changed, but it is less evident whether its prevalence
1

has changed. Although highly effective contraception (e.g., the pill, intra-uterine
devices, transabdominal sterilization) has been constantly available for the past thirty
years, more recent innovations in contraceptive technology (e.g., injectables, implants,
hysteroscopic sterilization) have left women with more choices, and presumably with
more success in remaining childless if they wish to do so. The childless-by-choice at the
turn of the twenty-first century still face stigma and deal with it in ways strikingly
similar to thirty years before (Veevers 1975; Park 2002), but can find camaraderie in
online support groups. Undergraduate textbooks of marriage and family increasingly
include voluntary childlessness as a legitimate lifestyle option (Chancey and Dumais
2006), and popular literature supporting it has recently been published not only in the
social science and personal growth genres (Burkett 2000; Cain 2001), but also in humor
and fiction (Metter 2001; Tonkunaga 2000). Given these developments, it is reasonable
to assume that voluntary childlessness is increasing, that society is more accepting of it,
or a combination of both.
The central goal of this thesis is to describe trends of voluntary childlessness in
the United States since the end of the baby boom. The use of consistent measures
applied to data from the same nationally representative repeated cross-sectional survey
will provide the best evidence of change in voluntary childlessness over the past thirty
years. Trends in total childlessness, voluntary childlessness, and the ratio of the latter to
the former will be shown by cohort and period. Trends in relative pregnancy risk by
birth control method for the voluntary childless compared to selected other categories of
women will also be shown. This thesis will establish that voluntary childlessness has
risen dramatically in the past few years, and present preliminary evidence supporting
the idea that the increase is partially due to the diffusion of innovations. The expected
2

future growth of voluntary childlessness and its implications will be discussed, along
with directions for future research.
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BACKGROUND
Theories of (Non) Parenthood
Children are no longer economic assets to households in developed countries.
Quite the opposite—the cost of food, shelter, entertainment, and education over the
lifetime of a child of a middle-class family is substantial. Some recent demographic
research has focused on why families continue to have children regardless of their cost.
Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa (1994) propose that having children can still be a
rational choice (even if it is not an economically sound one) because it reduces the
uncertainty in one’s life. Although the perception of the parent role may differ between
cultures, the role itself is universally known, and it is highly unlikely that a person has
no expectation of what her or his life would be like as a parent. If women have low
prospects for marriage, education, and/or a successful career, the uncertainty reduction
hypothesis states that they are likely to become parents to add stability to their lives.
Friedman et al. (1994) point out that this theory is one of the few that can explain why
two radically different groups have children: disadvantaged unmarried black teenagers
(for lack of other life choices) and the “old rich” (to maintain their dynasties). It follows
theoretically that women with a low degree of uncertainty will not “need” to have
children, and indeed, some mechanisms that reduce uncertainty in a woman’s life (e.g.,
higher education) are also correlates of voluntary childlessness.
Schoen et al. (1997), using data from the 1987-88 National Survey of Families
and Households, find that intentions to have children are related to viewing children as
providers of social capital. A form of investment capital, children help their parents
strengthen existing social ties (e.g., among grandparents) and create new ones (e.g.,
4

among other families with children). People who, for example, said that “giving my
parents grandchildren” or “having someone to care for me when I am old” were valid
reasons for childbearing were more likely to intend to reproduce. The analyses also
predicted that single white women who attached high importance to their career and
low importance to children as social resources were significantly likely to be voluntarily
childless. In the concluding sentence of the article, Schoen et al. state that “[children]
are seen as the threads from which the tapestry of life is woven” (1997:350). To adapt
their metaphor, perhaps the voluntarily childless weave their tapestry with different
material, to wit; a satisfying career and nongenerative forms of social gratification.
The Diffusion of Fertility Behavior
Diffusion of innovations theory (Rogers 2003) has been widely applied to fertility
behavior. The theory explains how new ideas or practices spread throughout a
population. Initially, a few people adopt a practice and, if others see this practice as
beneficial, they adopt it as well. This chain results in rapid adoption of the practice until
virtually everyone who would want to adopt it has done so. Often, the vanguard of such
a movement is of high status or motivation, because they have access to the new
information and can risk the possible social consequences of its application (Hirschman
1994). Fertility decline is often explained by diffusion of innovations theory, especially
when the decline occurs independent of modernization (Rosero-Bixby and Casterline
1993). Both the idea that a smaller family could be desirable, and the contraceptive
knowledge required to achieve a smaller family, can be diffused through various levels of
social interaction (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996). Livi-Bacci (1986) uses data from the
sixteenth to nineteenth century to show that fertility limitation was practiced first by the
5

aristocracy, then eventually spread to the populace. In a more recent example, Tolnay
(1995) provides a model showing that diffusion was instrumental in lowering fertility in
the mid-twentieth century American South.
If a preference for low fertility can diffuse, then certainly a preference for no
fertility can diffuse, though the saturation point for voluntary childlessness would be
much lower than the saturation point for a two-child family. It is more radical to
transition from the norm of parenting to not parenting than it is to transition from the
norm of four children to two children. Most of the population will always want children,
whether this tendency is explained by the need for uncertainty reduction, social capital,
or even by biological predispositions (Foster 2000; Friedman et al. 1994; Schoen et al.
1997). Also, voluntary childlessness could not diffuse too far, because mass adoption
would result in a population implosion.
It is more likely that some small but significant proportion of the population
would prefer to remain childless if it were considered a legitimate lifestyle choice. Many
people may be ambivalent about childbearing but never have considered the idea that it
was optional. Meeting a new friend who does not want children, or reading an article
about voluntary childlessness, may provide the impetus needed for the ambivalent to
become voluntarily childless themselves. Studies from the 1970s show voluntary
childlessness to be prevalent among high-status groups that are likely to be influential to
others (e.g., highly educated, white). If voluntary childlessness has increased since the
seventies but is less associated with its usual predictors, then diffusion is a likely
explanation.

6

Defining Voluntary Childlessness
Some believe that the voluntarily childless would be more aptly named
“childfree” since the term “childless” may be construed negatively, implying a lack of
something. Those who choose not to have children usually view themselves as liberated
of parenthood, therefore childfree seems an appropriate label. I contend that both
childless and childfree define a person in terms of her or his relationship to children, so
childfree may not be as revolutionary a term as its proponents would wish, even though
it is somewhat political. Rovi (1994) considers both terms to be based in ideology and
therefore dissatisfactory, but settles for a combination (“childless/childfree”)
throughout her paper. Following some of the earliest research on the matter (Veevers
1973), the term “voluntarily childless” will be used throughout this thesis in reference to
the subset of women who have never had children and who desire to remain in that
category, without any underlying implication that they are advantaged or disadvantaged
in relation to mothers.
Poston and Kramer (1983) provide a useful framework for defining voluntary
childlessness based on a “cognitive” and “behavioral” approach. Cognitively defined, the
childless are voluntarily so if they are physically able to have children, but state that they
do not intend to have children. Infertile women may also state that they do not intend
to have children, but that decision may be more likely to result from an acceptance of
their infertility rather than an actual preference for no children. In recognition of the
fact that voluntarily childless women may have been sterilized, women with no children
whose sterilizations were performed for contraceptive reasons are also classified as
voluntarily childless. Behaviorally, Poston and Kramer classify childless women as
voluntarily childless if they state that they do intend to have children in the future, but
7

are using contraception. Poston and Kramer find that their different methods of
classification produce vastly different results, but state that either could be used
depending on the researcher’s primary focus (1983:301).
Most studies follow the cognitive approach laid out above and restrict the age
range roughly to women’s reproductive years, starting in the late teens and ending in the
forties. Rovi (1994) supported the cognitive approach without restrictions on fecundity
status or certainty, because the act of simply stating that one does not intend to have
children is difficult within a pronatalist social context, and is therefore enough to
differentiate the voluntarily childless from the rest of the childless. If data on intentions
are not present, the oldest childless women are presumed to be primarily childless for
voluntary reasons (Poston and Trent 1982). This presumption makes sense if one
categorizes childlessness into voluntary, involuntary, and temporary. The temporarily
childless category disappears as women age and either become mothers, discover that
they have fertility problems, or decide not to have children. Subfecundity affects a
relatively small proportion of the population, and medical advances in reproductive
assistance can alleviate these problems for many women. Therefore, childless women in
their forties are assumed by many researchers to be mostly voluntarily childless.
Further restrictions are usually imposed based on marital status, though they
vary widely depending on the researcher and data source; some use ever-married
women (Mosher and Bachrach 1982; Poston and Trent 1982), some use currently
married (Krishnan 1993; Ritchey and Stokes 1974; Rovi 1994), and some add cohabiting
women (Krishnan 1993; Poston and Trent 1982). Other studies do not restrict the
sample based on whether the women are fertile (Poston and Trent 1982; Ritchey and
Stokes 1974; Rovi 1994; Stobert and Kemeny 2003). In this study I follow the majority
8

of the literature and use the cognitive approach to define voluntary childlessness,
restricting the sample to ever-married or currently married women when appropriate.
Characteristics of the Voluntarily Childless
Sociodemographic characteristics that normally affect fertility rates also serve to
distinguish the voluntarily childless from the rest of the population. The voluntarily
childless tend to be older than the childless in general, for a variety of reasons. Most
women do not have a child as soon as they become fecund, so many of their initial prime
reproductive years are spent at zero parity. As they age, they are more likely to have
children, so the age distribution of the childless is skewed toward the young. Most
young women expect to have children eventually, and state such intentions in surveys.
Women who state intentions to remain childless early are relatively rare—most arrive at
voluntary childlessness through postponement of reproduction (Veevers 1973). Using
longitudinal data, Heaton, Jacobson, and Holland (1999) also showed evidence of
postponement, finding that more couples who want children change their intentions
than voluntarily childless couples.
All studies find education to be high among the voluntarily childless, although
Ritchey and Stokes (1974) find that education has no effect when accounting for
postponed childbearing. Others find education to have significant positive effects
(Krishnan 1993; Mosher and Bachrach 1982; Poston 1990; Rovi 1994). Religion plays a
role as well, as Catholics, people in religiously homogamous marriages, and those who
attend worship services more often have lower rates of voluntary childlessness
(Krishnan 1993; Mosher and Bachrach 1982; Poston 1990). The childless-by-choice are
often characterized by no religious affiliation (Mosher and Bachrach 1982; Rovi 1994)
9

and/or low to no church attendance, with the latter consistently proven to be the
strongest religious variable to predict voluntary childlessness. Religious norms
generally encourage high levels of fertility and traditional values, which can run counter
to the values of a family with no children. The racial and ethnic makeup of the
voluntarily childless is difficult to ascertain. Several studies include only whites (e.g.,
Poston & Kramer 1983), and the only study restricted to blacks included only doctorate
holders (Mommsen 1975). Overall, it is known that childlessness in recent years is lower
among blacks than whites because of higher levels of fertility among blacks (Boyd 1989;
Veevers 1971). Studies that do include blacks and whites find a higher proportion of
voluntary childlessness among whites (Mosher and Bachrach 1982).
Recent Childlessness Trends
It is difficult to synthesize the existing literature on trends of voluntary
childlessness since the baby boom because of the widely differing operational definitions
and data sources. With data from the late 1960s, Ritchey and Stokes (1974) predicted
that 4.1 percent of married women would complete their fertility at zero parity,
regardless of the reason for their childlessness. Just a few years later, Poston and Trent
(1983) showed that the completed marital childlessness rate for Americans in 1970 was
11 percent. In the 1970s, estimates of voluntary childlessness in women ranged between
1.6 to 4.5 percent of North American women (Mosher and Bachrach 1982; Poston and
Kramer 1983; Rovi 1994), and in the 1980s, they ranged from 1.8 to 6.4 percent
(Krishnan 1993; Rovi 1994). Heaton et al. (1999) estimate that seven percent of the
American population was consistently voluntarily childless from 1988 to 1994. In
Canada in 2001, nine percent of singles and five percent of the currently-married
10

population aged 20 to 34 stated that they wished to remain childless permanently
(Stobert and Kemeny 2003).
Thus far I have outlined a picture of voluntarily childless Americans. There is not
a consensus on what they should be called, but they can be defined by their parity,
fertility intentions, and/or contraceptive behavior. Current theories of the perceived
benefits of parenthood (uncertainty reduction, social capital) to Americans can be
extended to show why the voluntarily childless do not want children. These
explanations mesh with the demographic profile of the voluntarily childless: older,
white, educated, and nonreligious. However, this profile may be changing if a
preference for no fertility has been diffusing between socioeconomic groups in recent
years. There is reason to suspect that voluntary childlessness is growing: cross-sectional
analyses for more recent years show higher percentages among the general population,
and popular literature increasingly features the subject. So, is voluntary childlessness
indeed a growing phenomenon? I explore this question with the above ideas in mind in
the following analyses.
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METHODOLOGY
Data
Data for this study come from the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG),
funded by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, conducted by
the National Center for Health Statistics at six semi-regular intervals from 1973 to 2002.
All survey data were collected through personal interviews. The universe of all six cycles
included the noninstitutionalized population of women aged 15-44 living in the
continental United States. In Cycles I (1973) and II (1976), only the ever-married or
custodial parents were included. The sample of Cycle V (1995) was taken from
households which were included in the National Health Interview Survey of 1993. Cycle
VI (2002) included men as well as women. I restrict my analyses to women only. The
number of women interviewed in each cycle was: Cycle I (1973), 9797; Cycle II (1976),
8611; Cycle III (1982), 7969; Cycle IV (1988), 8450; Cycle V (1995), 10847; Cycle VI
(2002), 7643.
The NSFG is appropriate and preferred for the study of voluntary childlessness
because it is focused on fertility rather than a large array of general topics and includes
probes for uncertain answers, unlike the Current Population Survey (CPS) and General
Social Survey (GSS), which have a high number of “undecided” responses to questions
on fertility intentions (Hagewen and Morgan 2005; Mosher and Bachrach 1982).
The most obvious limitation of the NSFG is that it is a repeated cross-sectional
survey, and longitudinal data may be the most appropriate for this type of study. A
panel survey could follow a cohort of women over their lifetime and directly measure
changes in fertility intentions. Heaton et al. (1999) show that small proportions of
12

couples entered and exited voluntary childlessness over a six-year period. I am also
limited to a less precise operational definition of voluntary childlessness because my
definition must be the same over all cycles of the NSFG. Cycles I-IV do not allow me to
measure whether a woman is a biological mother but not a social mother, that is, she
has had a live birth and is not raising her child. If a woman gave birth and put up her
baby for adoption, I would prefer to classify her as voluntarily childless because she has
elected not to fulfill the social role of mother. Nevertheless, in these data she will be
classified as a mother. Likewise, women who are not biological mothers but are social
mothers (e.g., of stepchildren or adopted children) will be classified as childless.
Because of the restriction imposed by the sampling frames of cycles I and II, I can only
include these cycles in my trend analyses if I restrict the sample to ever-married women.
Definitions
Age is the respondents’ age at last birthday at the time of the interview, and is
restricted by the sampling frame to range from 15 to 44, which I broke down into six
five-year age categories. I divided the women into six birth cohorts: 1928-39, 1940-9,
1950-9, 1960-9, 1970-9, and 1980-8. Year refers to the year of the survey. I constructed
two binary variables for marital status: ever married (1=formally married, divorced,
separated, or widowed, 0=all others) and currently married (1=formally married, 0=all
others). Race was either self-reported, or in the case of missing data, coded by the
interviewers’ observation, as black, white, or other. Respondents’ highest grade
completed was coded into three educational categories: less than high school, high
school or some college, and college degree or more.

13

The literature is clear on the importance of religious variables in the study of
voluntary childlessness. Catholicism, frequency of church attendance, and religious
homogamy have all been found significant. All of these variables were available in the
NSFG, but I chose to use only frequency of attendance at religious services. Attendance
has consistently been strong in models predicting voluntary childlessness, and I reason
that it is likely the most robust indicator of religiosity over time. For my purposes, I
coded this variable only for the NSFG surveys from 1982 and 2002. In 1982,
respondents were asked different questions about attendance based on their religion. If
they answered that they had no religion (or were atheist, agnostic, etc.), then they were
not asked how often they attended religious services. If they were Catholic, then they
were asked how often they received communion. In 2002, all respondents were asked
the frequency of their attendance at religious services. I classified these responses into
three categories: Never attends/no religion, attends services/receives communion
infrequently (a few times a month to less than once a year), and attends
services/receives communion frequently (once a week or more).
Fertility Categories. Women were classified according to parity (children ever
born) and future fertility intentions. I defined the childless as those with parity zero,
and then divided them into voluntarily childless and other childless.
In the first five cycles of the NSFG, all nonsterile respondents were asked about
their future reproductive intentions, or their and their husbands’ or partners’ joint
reproductive intentions. Women who gave an uncertain response (e.g., “don’t know” or
up to God”) or who disagreed with their significant others were probed by the
interviewer to choose “the largest number of (additional) babies [they/they and their
husbands] expect to have.” I classified childless women who said that they did not
14

intend to have any children, or who answered “none” to the probe, as voluntarily
childless. Only thirty-seven women over the first five cycles were classified as
voluntarily childless by the probe. In the 2002 cycle of the NSFG, married or partnered
women were also asked these questions on intentions and expectations, so I classified
them in the same manner as the previous surveys. However, single women were first
asked if they “want[ed] to have a(nother) baby” (emphasis mine), then only asked their
intentions if they answered in the affirmative. Therefore, I classified single childless
women who were surveyed in 2002 as voluntarily childless if they answered that they
did not want to have any children. In all cycles, sterile childless women were not asked
their reproductive intentions, but I classified them as voluntarily childless if they
reported that their (or their husbands’ or partners’) sterilization was performed at least
partially for contraceptive reasons.
For comparison, I created two other categories: mothers (parity ≥ 1) who
intended no more births, and women (any parity) who intended (more) births.
Contraceptive Classification. Women were also classified according to the
effectiveness of the birth control method they were using at the time they were surveyed.
There is much debate over the calculation of contraceptive failure rates (see
Trussell and Kost 1987; Trussell et al. 1990). Determining the efficiency of a given birth
control method in a given year is not simply a matter of whether source data can be
obtained, but whether such data were analyzed with correct statistical methodology.
There is no single source cataloging the evolution of contraceptive failure rates over the
time period of interest, so any differences in rates from 1982 to 1995, for example, could
possibly be attributed more to greater statistical precision than any real change in
failure rates between those years. Abortion under-reporting, in particular, is
15

problematic for researchers attempting to determine contraceptive efficacy, since a
respondent who had an abortion because her birth control failed is likely to answer in a
survey that she was not pregnant at all, so that instance would not count as a
contraceptive failure (Trussell and Vaughan 1999).
Since my interest is not to obtain precise contraceptive failure rates, but instead
to determine respondents’ risk of pregnancy, I decided to use the most recent, most
authoritative source available: A summary table of contraceptive efficacy from
Contraceptive Technology, Eighteenth Revised Edition (Trussell 2004). I classified
respondents’ current contraceptive status into three categories: 1) using no method/at
high risk of pregnancy; 2) using a less effective method/at marginal risk of pregnancy;
and 3) using a highly effective method/at little to no risk of pregnancy. A “less effective”
method is one with a typical-use failure rate of 10 percent or more, and a “more
effective” method is one with a rate of less than 10 percent. Ten percent is a logical
threshold, because when imposed, sterilization and all hormonal methods (except the
morning-after pill) of contraception fall into the “more effective” category, and all
barrier methods and others (withdrawal, natural family planning) fall into the “less
effective” category. Note that with theoretical “perfect” use, some of the barrier
methods (e.g., the male condom with spermicide) would fall into the “more effective”
category. Likewise, an ordinarily “more effective” method may be used very poorly (e.g.,
the pill with frequent missed doses), and should then fall into the “less effective”
category. The rates used for my purposes are the average first-year typical-use failure
rates.
I classified women into relative pregnancy risk categories based on their
contraceptive status at the time of each survey. No method/high risk includes seeking
16

pregnancy, nonusers, abortion, and those who douche for cleanliness only. Less
effective method/marginal risk includes post-partum (to account for the variable
contraceptive efficacy of post-partum amenorrhea [Coale and Trussell 1996:473; Weeks
2002:175]), diaphragm, cervical cap, male and female condoms, foam/spermicide,
rhythm/periodic abstinence/natural family planning, withdrawal, douche, sponge,
insert/suppository, and other or unknown methods. Highly effective method/low to no
risk of pregnancy includes sterilization (for any reason), the pill, implant, injectable,
intra-uterine device (IUD), and abstinence, as well as being currently pregnant.
Analysis
I will present several tables and figures charting change over time in childlessness
and voluntary childlessness. First, I compute descriptive statistics of these two groups
by year and selected demographic variables. Second, I compute rates of childlessness
and voluntary childlessness of ever-married women by year, age-standardized when
appropriate. Next, I detail the change in childlessness, voluntary childlessness, and the
latter as a percentage of the former over time by age and birth cohort. Finally, I
calculate the relative pregnancy risk of three categories of currently married women: the
voluntarily childless, mothers with completed fertility, and women who intend to have
children, for each survey year.

17

RESULTS
Trends
It is evident from Table 1 that childlessness fluctuates, and has greatly increased in
recent years among the higher age categories, especially in data from the 2002 NSFG.
Women have been ending their reproductive years recently at the highest rates of
childlessness in the past thirty years. Recent increases in voluntary childlessness are
even more dramatic—percentages for women in the top three age groups approximately
doubled from 1995 to 2002. Overall, 5.7 percent of ever-married women in 2002 were
voluntarily childless—a figure that has nearly tripled since 1976. In Figure 1, I show
period trends of childlessness and voluntary childlessness for ever-married women over
all years of the NSFG, age-standardized to the distribution of all ever-married women in
the 2002 cycle. Although overall childlessness has been increasing steadily since the
1970s, voluntary childlessness stayed relatively constant until the late eighties. Table 1
and Figure 1 show a surprisingly substantial and recent increase in voluntary
childlessness.
In Figure 2, I present a cohort graph in the style of Poston and Gotard (1977) for
ever-married childless women. All of the lines follow similar paths, with high
childlessness found at lower ages and low childlessness found at higher ages. Four of
the cohorts have reached the end of their reproductive lifespan, and their completed
childlessness (at the last two age groups) is neatly ordered—the earlier the cohort, the
lower the childlessness. These four cohorts have kept the same order in all age groups
but the very youngest, when women born in the 1950s had higher childlessness than
women born in the 1960s. Women in the 1970-9 cohort follow an interesting path,
18

Table 1: Percentages of Childlessness and Voluntary Childlessness in EverMarried Women by Age and Year
Age Category
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
ALL
Year
1973
1976
1982
1988
1995
2002
1973
1976
1982
1988
1995
2002

47.2
50.4
42.5
40.9
38.5
44.4
1.4
3.4
-

31.6
33.4
34.2
33.6
34.4
35.2
1.8
2.1
1.4
2.0

17.5
17.2
19.0
22.5
25.4
23.5

Childless (all)
7.3
8.5
11.3
14.6
14.8
20.1

6.1
6.3
10.2
10.0
11.8
13.7

7.3
5.5
7.9
7.9
11.2
14.6

15.2
15.3
16.4
15.6
16.3
19.4

Voluntarily Childless
1.9
1.9
2.5
1.9
1.9
2.1
1.8
2.4
2.6
1.8
2.5
2.4
2.9
2.0
3.9
2.3
4.5
6.1

2.9
1.8
2.3
3.1
5.0
10.3

2.2
2.0
2.1
2.3
3.3
5.7

Note: Missing values in table are due to very small sample sizes in these categories.
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Figure 1: Age-Standardized Percentages of Ever-Married Childless and
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20

60

Percent Childless

50

40

30

20

10

0
15-19

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

Age
1928-39

1940-9

1950-9

1960-9

1970-9

1980-8
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beginning with the lowest rates of childlessness for the youngest age group, and ending
with the highest of the early thirties age group. Time will reveal the full pattern of
women born in the 1980s, who already showed the highest rate of childlessness among
cohorts in their early twenties.
Figure 3 shows percentages of voluntary childlessness among cohorts of evermarried women. The cohort of women born in the 1980s and all teenage women were
removed from the figure because of very small sample sizes among those groups. The
pattern of voluntary childlessness is similar for the oldest four cohorts until the women
reach their late thirties, then the cohorts of the 1950s and 1960s diverge sharply and
significantly from the 1930s and 1940s. The two oldest cohorts of women did not vary
much with age in the last three age groups. Most of these women entered their
childbearing years during the baby boom (the others were the oldest of those born
during the baby boom), and the steady pattern of low voluntary childlessness regardless
of age may indicate that they permanently internalized the pronatalist values of that era.
95 percent confidence intervals (vertical bars with corresponding colors) show
statistically significant differences between those born in 1928-49 and those born in
1950-69. Women born in the 1960s are significantly more likely to be voluntarily
childless in their late thirties than women born a decade before, but the confidence
intervals overlap in the last age group. The 1970-9 cohort already showed the highest
percent of voluntary childlessness in their early thirties (the last age for which data was
available). These trends suggest that women who want to remain childless are making
that decision, and abiding by it, earlier in life the more recently they were born. If they
follow the age pattern of women from the two previous decades, voluntary childlessness
will continue to grow at an exponential rate. But note again that the differences between
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the 50s and 60s cohorts may no longer be significant when the women have reached
their forties. Women born in the 1970s may also converge with previous cohorts at later
ages and eventually show us the ceiling of voluntary childlessness.
Figure 4 shows the proportion of voluntary childlessness to overall childlessness
by age and cohort. The consistent upward trend shows that, indeed, voluntary
childlessness composes an increasingly large percentage of overall childlessness as
cohorts age. 95 percent confidence intervals show that, in the 35-39 age group, there is
a significant difference between the 1940-9 cohort and the 1960-9 cohort, and intervals
that only slightly overlap (e.g., 1928-39 and 1940-49) may also be statistically
significant. In the next age group, however, there are significant differences between
the 1928-49 cohorts and the 1950-69 cohorts. Again, there is a plateau of sorts in the
two oldest cohorts for the top three age categories, but it is surprising that such a
consistently high percentage is found in the 1928-39 cohort. I speculate that the
divergence in trends among the 30s and 40s cohorts and the 50s and 60s cohorts is due
to increases in voluntary childlessness through postponement among the younger
cohorts. The older women came of age when fertility levels were much higher and age at
first birth was much lower. These two factors, combined with low rates of
postponement and low rates of overall childlessness, make for a relatively high
proportion of voluntary childlessness because they separated women very early into
those who had children and those who did not. Women who did not have children fairly
early in life most likely came to terms with that fact early as well (since the upper age
limit for childbearing was younger than current standards), and thus fell into the
voluntary childless category.
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Figure 4: Voluntary Childlessness as a Percent of Overall Childlessness for
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In Figure 5, I show the efficacy of the birth control method used by three
categories of women: the voluntarily childless, mothers who desire no more children,
and women who want (more) children, with 95 percent confidence intervals. The
majority of all women in all years are using birth control. Immediately evident are the
higher proportions of birth control users in 2002 who are using highly effective
methods. Among birth control users, the voluntarily childless put themselves at a
greater pregnancy risk than mothers with completed fertility in nearly every year,
though these differences are only significant for users of less effective methods in the
seventies and nineties. This may be indicative of greater ambivalence among the
voluntarily childless than among mothers who want no more children. Also striking is
the similarity of the voluntarily childless to women who want more children among
users of no method in the 1970s and 1980s. As Mosher and Bachrach (1982) suggest,
voluntarily childless nonusers of contraception may soon become mothers despite their
wishes. Likewise, due to the effects of postponement, some of the women who currently
want children but are using birth control will drift into the voluntarily childless category
(Heaton et al. 1999).
Preliminary Evidence for Diffusion
In Table 2, I present descriptive statistics for childless women by race, education,
and religious service attendance for the 1982 and 2002 NSFG surveys. The former was
a better choice than 1973 for comparison with 2002 because 1982 was the first year that
the NSFG surveyed all women instead of only ever-married women or custodial
mothers. Also, as evidenced in Table 1 and Figure 1, 1982 rates of voluntary
childlessness did not differ much from the 1970s rates.
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Table 2: Percent of Voluntarily Childless Women by Race, Education, and
Religious Service Attendance, 1982 and 2002
NSFG 1982
NSFG 2002
Percent
Percent
N
N
voluntary
voluntary
childless childless childless childless
White
With college degree
Never attends/no religion
136
28.57
252
39.25
Attends services infrequently
253
19.09
587
24.84
Attends services frequently
193
6.25
440
14.45
High school or some college
Never attends/no religion
543
15.41
672
31.86
Attends services infrequently
1345
7.37
1187
20.09
Attends services frequently
899
3.64
775
14.12
Less than high school
Never attends/no religion
282
11.67
388
21.39
Attends services infrequently
543
5.30
533
15.00
Attends services frequently
361
5.43
432
7.34
Nonwhite
With college degree
Never attends/no religion
23
14.29
62
15.15
Attends services infrequently
153
14.75
166
17.95
Attends services frequently
119
16.22
177
14.71
High school or some college
Never attends/no religion
176
11.67
195
29.33
Attends services infrequently
1076
11.22
545
18.97
Attends services frequently
706
11.11
480
18.30
Less than high school
Never attends/no religion
172
14.29
154
26.23
Attends services infrequently
539
11.94
291
16.51
Attends services frequently
391
11.23
270
11.76
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As seen in previous charts, greater percentages of voluntary childlessness appear
in 2002 than in 1982. Interestingly, the correlates of voluntary childlessness that have
repeatedly been confirmed by the literature appear to be fading somewhat in
importance, lending support to the idea that voluntary childlessness is diffusing. In
both 1982 and 2002, white college-educated nonreligious women had the highest
percentage of voluntary childlessness, but the gap between this demographic category
and others is narrowing in 2002. Among whites with a high school degree or some
college in 1982, the proportion of voluntary childlessness to childlessness doubles (or
halves) neatly at each level of religiosity. The lowest incidence of voluntary
childlessness found in the table, 3.64 percent, occurs for these women at the highest
level of religiosity. For whites in the middle educational category in 2002, the rates of
voluntary childlessness for medium to no religiosity are very similar to 1982 rates for the
highest educational category. In turn, white women with less than high school in 2002
are voluntarily childless at much higher rates than their 1982 high school graduate
counterparts. These results show substantial diffusion across educational categories
between 1982 and 2002. For high religiosity in 2002, the percent voluntarily childless is
almost the same between high school graduates and college graduates, but is halved for
women with less than high school.
Nonwhite women follow a much different pattern, which may be due to a faulty
dichotomy of white/nonwhite. The nonwhite category could be too heterogenous, and
its composition may have changed over time. College-educated nonwhite women are
voluntarily childless at very similar rates for all levels of religiosity for both times
surveyed. Among those with high school or some college, nonwhites increased quite a
bit in percent voluntarily childless between 1982 and 2002, with 2002 percentages
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closer to 1982 white college-educated percentages. Religiosity does affect voluntary
childlessness for nonwhites in the middle educational category in 2002, although the
frequency of religious service attendance does not matter—the difference here is
between women who attend and who do not attend religious services. It is the
nonwhites with less than high school in 2002 who most closely follow the white pattern
of voluntary childlessness by religiosity, and actually show higher percentages than their
white counterparts.
These basic statistics provide an overview of how voluntary childlessness has
changed over a twenty-year period in the United States. The voluntarily childless are
generally high on educational attainment, which is consistent with both previous
research and with theoretical expectations derived from Friedman et al. (1994) and
Schoen et al. (1997). Frequent attendance at religious services, a mark of traditional
values, nearly always characterizes the lowest percentages of voluntary childlessness.
Preliminary evidence is found to support the hypothesis that voluntary childlessness is
spreading among whites by diffusion of innovations, but perhaps not for nonwhites.
Further research should test this idea, and may find a parallel between the diffusion of
cohabitation from highly educated nonreligious whites to a greater mix of the
population (e.g., Wilhelm 1998).
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study intended to investigate whether and how voluntary childlessness
changed in the United States in the last part of the twentieth century. I used a variety of
measures to analyze the trends in negative fertility intentions of childless women,
computing rates both by cohort and by period for overall childlessness, voluntary
childlessness, and voluntary childlessness as a percentage of overall childlessness. I
showed the changing relative pregnancy risks by the failure rate of the current
contraceptive method of voluntary childless women compared to mothers with
completed fertility and women with affirmative fertility intentions. I also compared
1982 and 2002 percentages of voluntary childlessness among women by race,
education, and religiosity.
Previous studies provided estimates of voluntary childlessness scattered through
the time period of interest, but they could not be used for evidence of real change
because of varying data sources and operational definitions. The results of this study
show that voluntary childlessness increased rapidly around the turn of the twenty-first
century relative to the 1970s and 1980s, composing 5.7% of all ever-married American
women in their reproductive years in 2002. Trends show that increases in voluntary
childlessness have been due to baby boomers arriving in that category through
postponement of fertility as they age, and to younger women deciding to remain
childless earlier in life. Table 2 showed that as the incidence of voluntary childlessness
increased in recent years, it has also spread among sociodemographic groups. It seems
that white college-educated nonreligious women in 1982 represented the early adopters
of voluntary childlessness. Twenty years later, while voluntary childlessness still varies
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with education and religious service attendance, the practice is diffusing to white
women in all educational and religious categories, along with nonwhite women in some
categories. Thus, increases in voluntary childlessness may also be due to innovation and
diffusion among groups.
How high can voluntary childlessness go? Women born in the 1970s will show us
by the mid-2020s. I see two paths for them. One, they could maintain their upward
trend following the women ten and twenty years older, and reach a historically high
level of cohort voluntary childlessness around fifteen percent. Two, they could reach a
convergence of sorts with the two next oldest birth cohorts, and establish the ceiling of
voluntary childlessness at or just under ten percent.
It is hard to imagine that voluntary childlessness could compose much more than
ten percent of the population without significant political battles. The voluntarily
childless could possibly gain enough political clout with their numbers to affect “familyfriendly” policies that are increasingly alienating to them (Burkett 2000). Such policies
appear frequently in the workplace, which is a place of especially high importance to the
career-oriented voluntarily childless. Proposed by the World Childfree Association is
the Australian Childfree Party, which lists diverse goals related to taxation and housing
relating to “promotion of the childfree lifestyle as opposed to promotion of the family
lifestyle” (2006).
Although modern voluntary childlessness emerged in the early 1970s, it has
begun to spread and change rapidly in recent years. Most research has centered on the
description, prediction, and social consequences of a choice to remain childless. Future
research should move beyond this by incorporating the knowledge that voluntary
childlessness has changed over time. The hypothesis that voluntary childlessness is
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growing through a process of innovation and diffusion should be explicitly tested. As
the age at marriage and first birth increase over time, so do the number of potential
adopters of voluntary childlessness—ergo, dynamic diffusion models will be necessary
(Mahajan and Peterson 1985). Overall trends should be continually monitored as new
data are released. As voluntary childlessness becomes more prevalent, research should
show that the corresponding social consequences may be lessening. Racial and ethnic
differences among the voluntarily childless should be more carefully studied—models
should not control for race by excluding blacks, and the role of Hispanic origin should
be analyzed. Finally, given that fertility intentions can be reversed, longitudinal data
would be most useful for future research on voluntary childlessness.
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